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The Wallstrom objection as a possibility to augment quantum theory
I. Schmelzer∗
Wallstrom has argued that quantum interpretations which construct the wave function starting
from Madelung variables ψ(q) = ρ(q) exp( i
~
S(q)), in particular many variants of Nelsonian stochas-
tics, are not equivalent to quantum theory. Accepting this, we explicitly add the physical restriction
(∀q ∈ Q)|ψ(q)|2 > 0 in the configuration space representation to quantum theory. The resulting
theories depend on the choice of the configuration space Q.
The restriction adds possibilities to falsify such theories, making them preferable following Pop-
per’s criterion of empirical content until they have been really falsified.
Considering the case of a relativistic scalar field, we argue that it is reasonable to expect that the
variant based on particle ontology can be (or even has been already) falsified, while to falsify the
variant based on field ontology seems much harder, if not impossible.
If correct, switching to a field ontology seems a reasonable choice for interpretations based on
Madelung variables to circumvent the Wallstrom objection.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a whole class of interpretations of quantum
theory which is based on Madelung variables1 – the
fields ρ(q), S(q) defining the wave function by ψ(q) =√
ρ(q) exp( i
~
S(q)) [1]-[10]. They can be used if the
Hamiltonian is quadratic in the momentum variables. As
the typical example for such a theory, one usually starts
with non-relativistic single-particle theory:
H =
1
2m
〈p, p〉+ V (q). (1)
Then, the Schro¨dinger equation in these variables gives
a continuity equation for ρ(q)
∂tρ(q) +∇(ρ(q)~v(q)) = 0 (2)
with a velocity defined by the gradient of S(q):
m~v(q) = ∇S(q). (3)
together with a quantum generalization of the classical
Hamilton-Jacobi equation for S(q)
− ∂tS(q) = 1
2m
〈∇S(q),∇S(q)〉 + V (q) +Q(q). (4)
which differs from the classical Hamilton-Jacobi equation
only by a so-called quantum potential:
Q(q) = − ~
2
2m
∆
√
ρ√
ρ
. (5)
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1 These variables have been originally proposed by Madelung [1]
for one-particle Schro¨dinger theory, with the aim to give it a hy-
drodynamic interpretation. As a consequence, they are usually
named “hydrodynamic variables”. For the actual applications in
the interpretation of quantum theory a hydrodynamic interpre-
tation makes no sense, given that the theory is defined on the
configuration space, not the physical space. To name them “hy-
drodynamic” is therefore grossly misleading, so that I name them
here (and propose to do this in general) “Madelung variables”.
To generalize this to many-particle theory is straightfor-
ward. Less well-known is that relativistic field theory can
also made fit into this scheme – which destroys the pop-
ular prejudice that such interpretations can cover only
non-relativistic theories.
Madelung variables are, without doubt, helpful if one
wants to consider the classical limit ~ → 0. In this
limit, the Schro¨dinger equation automatically gives the
classical Hamilton-Jacobi equation together with a cor-
responding continuity equation for the probability flow.
But what we are interested here is another application of
these variables, namely in interpretations where the vari-
ables ρ(q), S(q) together with the equations (2), (4) are
considered as fundamental, while the wave function ψ(q)
together with the Schro¨dinger equation are constructed
out of them. This is the base of many variants of Nelso-
nian stochastics [2]-[10].
This is unproblematic only in one direction: every valid
global solution of (2), (4) defines a valid solution of the
Schro¨dinger equation. Unfortunately, not every solution
of the Schro¨dinger equation can be constructed in this
way, but only solutions with |ψ(q)|2 > 0 everywhere.
As argued by Wallstrom [18, 19], near the zeros of the
wave function the equivalence fails, so that theories start-
ing from Madelung variables give theories which are not
equivalent to quantum theory – they forbid zeros of the
wave function.
A simple but uninteresting solution is to give up the
idea to derive the Schro¨dinger equation from (2), (4).
This seems popular among proponents of de Broglie-
Bohm theory: While Madelung variables have been used
by Bohm himself [12], they don’t play a central role in
many modern presentations of dBB theory like [14], [15].
Given that the equations of dBB theory anyway have to
postulated instead of being derived, this is not a big loss.
The situation is different for Nelsonian stochastics and
its variants, where (2), (4) can be derived, giving them a
much superior status in comparison with the Schro¨dinger
equation itself.
One way to solve this problem would be to handle the
zeros of the wave function differently. This requires al-
ready an explicit modification of quantum theory itself,
2because near the zeros of the wave function |~v| becomes
infinite and, moreover, the flow is no longer a potential
(irrotational) flow globally. The resulting theory would
have to be a different, subquantum theory. In [21], the
author has considered such alternatives and found that
they could plausibly in a quantum limit lead to the con-
dition 0 < ∆ρ(q) <∞ almost everywhere at the zeros of
the wave function. This would allow zeros of the wave
function in general position, so that arbitrary close to
every quantum solution where would be a solution which
could be obtained in this way.
This solution requires the acceptance that quantum
theory itself has to be modified, and survives near the
zeros of the wave function only as an approximation. An
even more serious problem would be that in the more
fundamental theory there exists no wave function and no
potential of the flow S(q). For some interpretations based
on Madelung variables this may be unproblematic. But
in particular for Caticha’s entropic dynamics [9, 10] this
would be fatal, because the function S(q) + ln
√
ρ(q) is
interpreted there as an entropy. This allows a derivation
of the equations from first principles of entropic infer-
ence. This derivation from first principles could not be
preserved in a subquantum theory following [21], because
there would not exist a potential S(q) for the velocity in
the more fundamental subquantum theory.
In this paper, we evaluate another possibility, namely
a quite radical, straightforward one – to add the con-
dition that |ψ(q)|2 > 0 holds for all q ∈ Q to quan-
tum theory. This defines a new theory, with Nelsonian
stochastics as well as its many variants as possible in-
terpretations. It would be empirically falsifiable by the
preparation of states which would have to have zeros in
the configuration space representation. Given that this
would not falsify quantum theory, this gives additional
empirical content, thus, makes it superior to quantum
theory (following Popper’s criterion of empirical content)
until it is actually falsified.
The condition |ψ(q)|2 > 0 holds only for the wave func-
tion in the configuration space Q. Zeros in, say, the mo-
mentum representation would be irrelevant and could not
falsify the new theory. So, theories with different choices
of the configuration space – a choice which seemed to be
purely metaphysical up to now – define now physically
different theories.
We will argue below that the choice of Q does really
matter, by considering two popular choices of the con-
figuration space for the case of a scalar field theory: We
will name “stochastic particle theory” the theory based
on the particle ontology, where the number and position
of particles defines the configuraion, and “stochastic field
theory” the theory based on the field ontology, where the
field values ϕ(x) in space define the configuration.
Generalizations to field theories with non-zero spin we
leave to future research, given that, on the one hand,
there will be known problems defining both variants for
the same spin (positions for photons, as well as classical
field configurations for fermions). On the other hand,
for the conceptual problems considered in this paper, a
rough look suggests that these problems will not play a
decisive role.
II. GENERAL PROBLEMS OF PREPARING
STATES WITH ZEROS
Let’s consider now what we have to do to construct a
state which violates the condition |ψ(q)|2 > 0 for some
q ∈ Q.
One naive hope could be that the evolution would do
everything itself: Say, if we would start with an arbi-
trary wave function, possibly without zeros, the evolu-
tion would automatically create, in some time, some ze-
ros. This does not work. Instead, it appears that the
quantum potential term in equation (4) gives a good pro-
tection against the density becoming zero. Indeed, for
|ψ(q)|2 → 0 the quantum potential obtains large negative
values, Q(q) → −∞ at least at the minimum of |ψ(q)|2.
This creates an inflow into this minimum. So, at least
with the physical level of certainty, we can be sure that
a probability distribution which is nonzero everywhere
initially remains nonzero everywhere forever.
Another naive idea would be to construct a sufficiently
large number of basic states, so that all other states could
be obtained as a superposition of those basic states. Un-
fortunately in the stochastic theories we do not have a
superposition principle: If there exists states in Madelung
variables leading to the wave functions ψ1(q), ψ2(q), there
may be no Madelung variables for their superpositions
α1ψ1 + α2ψ2. That means, superpositions simply may
not exist. So, we have to create the problematic state
itself, and have to do this in a pure form.
This creates a problem with creating states of moving
particles. How do we create a moving particle state? A
moving particle will be emitted at some origin and then
hit some target. After this we can even make a good
guess when it was emitted. But what we can create is
essentially only the emitter state. This state of the emit-
ter, with some probability, emits the particle. But the
result is not a pure state of a flying particle. During the
time of possible emission, we have only a superposition of
a state of an emitted particle and a not yet emitted par-
ticle. The “not yet emitted particle” part is the vacuum
state of the corresponding field, which is a ground state
with no zeros at all. So, the construction by construct-
ing the emitter would give (at every particular place)
only a superposition of the state with a flying particle
with a sufficiently large vacuum contribution. Once the
vacuum does not have any zeroes, a large enough vacuum
contribution gives not much hope to create states with
unavoidable zeroes in this way.
So, we would better restrict our considerations to sta-
tionary states.
But even in this case, some other contributions cannot
be avoided. To see this we have to consider here the
way how to prepare particular states in general. This
3general preparation procedure of a quantum state starts
with the quantum system being in an unknown state,
measures some operator αˆ with eigenstates ψi(qsys), so
that the measurement result i prepares the state in that
eigenstate ψi(qsys). So we start with
ψsys(qsys) =
∑
i
αiψ
sys
i (qsys)
with unknown values αi. We combine it with a mea-
surement device, which is assumed to be in its ground
state ψ0(qdev), which we can be assumed to be with-
out zeroes. We also have to assume both are indepen-
dent, so that the wave function of the whole system is
ψ = ψsys(qsys)ψ0(qdev). Now we let the whole system
interact in a way which measures the operator αˆ. The
Schro¨dinger evolution gives after the interaction
ψ(qsys, qdev) =
∑
i
αiψ
sys
i (qsys)ψ
dev
i (qdev).
Now the question appears how the measurement result is
identified. Here, we have to follow the prescriptions of the
realist interpretations under consideration. They all have
definite trajectories of the measurement device qdev(t)
which describe the actual state of the device, and they
all assume also that it is this actual state qdev(t) which
is observed as the measurement result of a macroscopic,
classical device.
As a consequence, all these interpretations share also
to rule how to define the resulting state of the quantum
system: We have to put the observed value of the classical
measurement result qdev(t) into the full wave function
ψ(qsys, qdev) to obtain a wave function ψsys(qsys) of the
quantum system:
ψsys(qsys) =
∑
i
αiψi(qsys)ψ
dev
i (q
obs
dev).
In an ideal experiment, the eigenfunctions ψdevi (.) would
not overlap at all, and the value qobsdev would identify
the measurement result exactly, and therefore the result
would be one of the eigenstates ψsysi (qsys), namely the
only one where ψdevi (q
obs
dev) 6= 0, with ψdevj (qobsdev) = 0 for
all j 6= i. But, again, to obtain what stochastic me-
chanics predicts we have to follow the rules of stochastic
mechanics, and in stochastic mechanics we have no exact
zeros of the wave function. So, all what we can hope for
is that |ψj(qobsdev)|2 ≪ 1 for all j 6= i. As a consequence, we
will not be able to construct in any real experiment pure
eigenstates of interesting operators. All we can hope for
is
ψsys(qsys) ≈ ψsysi (qsys).
So, all that we can construct is only some minor modifi-
cation ψ(q) + δψ(q) with some small but unknown error
contribution δψ(q).
Thus, a zero of the wave function has to be stable
against minor modifications of the wave function, else we
could not claim that we have constructed a state with a
zero of the wave function.
Last but not least, let’s note that to prepare a particu-
lar state in a way which is sufficiently certain to identify a
zero, one has to restrict oneself to very low energy. This
is quite obvious, given that states with higher energies
will usually somehow move, but we have to restrict our-
selves to stable states. Unfortunately, the state with the
lowest energy – the vacuum – is one without any zeros.
Fortunately, for many stablee states with low energy it
remains possible to create and identify them correctly.
But if the energy increases, this becomes much harder,
and this difficulty increases very fast.
III. PARTICLE ONTOLOGY: ANGULAR
MOMENTUM EIGENSTATES OF PARTICLES
Fortunately, such minor distortions are not sufficient
to get rid of all zeroes completely. While for a one-
dimensional configuration a small distortion of the wave
function is always sufficient to get rid of zeros, in two
dimensions we can already have zeros in a general po-
sition, that means, adding an arbitrary small distortion
will only shift the position of the zero, but does not allow
to get rid of it completely.
The classical example of such states are angular mo-
mentum eigenstates with nontrivial angular momentum
in one-particle non-relativistic quantum theory. One
would not expect that relativistic effects become rele-
vant here, so that we will ignore relativistic effects.2 It
is this example which is mentioned in the original papers
by Wallstrom [18],[19].
So, let’s consider a state with Lz = 1 and restrict our-
selves to the plane z = 0. Then the zero is located at x =
y = 0 and surrounded by a circle
√
x2 + y2 = r0 where
|ψ|2 = ρ0 > 0 and the dependence on the angle ϕ is eiϕ.
Let’s consider a small deformation ψ(~x)→ ψ(~x)+δψ(~x).
If |δψ|2 ≪ ρ0, the deformation will be insufficient to lead
to a zero at r0. Thus, during the whole deformation the
image of the circle r0 will remain inside C
∗, its winding
number cannot change and has to remain 1. And there-
fore there has to remain a zero of the wave function inside
the circle too.
Are more objections possible? Yes. The states with
small but nonzero angular momentum eigenstates one
would start to think about would be (ignoring spin)
states of electrons in atoms. But in everyday life these
atoms themselves move around. Thus, the same general
objections against moving states can be applied here too.
2 Relativistic approaches with particle ontology exist, in particular
following [13], and they are quite popular in the context of dBB
theory [15]. But to consider here and now relativisitic corrections
does not seem necessary, given that what has to be constructed
are anyway only stable states, and that the argument depends
only on quite rough qualitative properties of these states.
4To meet this objection, one would have to fix, addition-
ally, also the position of the atomic nucleus. Moreover, it
has to be fixed in a sufficiently accurate way so that the
additional uncertainty created by the position of the nu-
cleus does not distort the state of the electron so much
that the proof that there has to be a zero inside fails.
This would, if realized, falsify the version of the theory
that the wave function does not have zeros in the config-
uration space if the configuration space is defined by a
particle ontology.
A. Falsification based on quantum computation?
Another already existing candidate would be the con-
structions of quantum computers. One can reasonably
guess that there exist various states of a quantum com-
puter which have stable zeros in the sense described
above. This is a question which would have to be clarified
by specialists for quantum computation.
In principle, one would have to study the consequences
of using stochastic particle theory for quantum compu-
tation too. Last but not least, quantum computation de-
pends on quantum theory being accurate and completely
unrestricted by conditions that there should be no ze-
ros of the wave function in a particular representation.
Would quantum computation fail in stochastic particle
theory? We cannot exclude this possibility. Of course,
the equations are exactly the same in stochastic parti-
cle theory as in quantum theory. So, from this point of
view, nothing changes. But the quantum computer starts
with a preparation procedure, and, as shown above, such
a preparation procedure will not give pure non-vacuum
eigenstates, but only states with small distortions. If
these small distortions prevent the preparations of states
with zeros initially, the future evolution will prevent them
during the whole computation. But what if intermediate
states with such zeros play a key role in the computa-
tion itself? Can this possibly create systematic errors of
quantum computers in some unavoidable way?
This question has to be left for future reasearch. But,
independent of this, the possibility that the construction
of quantum computers has already created states which
can be, with sufficient certainty, identified as pure states
with zeros which are stable against minor distortions, is
quite plausible.
Thus, it seems quite plausible that stochastic parti-
cle theory can be easily falsified. Probably existing con-
structions of quantum computers already contain states
which would falsify the particle ontology – all what would
be necessary is to evaluate such constructions from this
point of view. If not, then one would expect that to con-
struct such states is possible, and all what has to be done
is to realize such a construction.
IV. FIELD ONTOLOGY: THE CASE OF
RELATIVISTIC SCALAR FIELD THEORY
Let’s now consider an example with a field ontology.
While the field ontology defines a much more natural
candidate in particular for relativistic field theories, it
has been largely ignored in considerations about hidden
variable theories. Indeed, it is quite common to claim
that such hidden variable theories like dBB as well as
Nelsonian stochastics exist only for non-relativistic par-
ticle theory. But in fact the general scheme works nicely
for all Hamiltonians with a quadratic dependence on the
momentum variables, and in relativistic field theories we
have this type of dependence. So, for relativistic scalar
field theory, we have
H =
1
2
∫
π(x)2 +∇ϕ∇ϕ +m2ϕ2d3x. (6)
In this paper, we restrict ourselves to the case of a single
scalar field.3
In this case the configuration space is defined by the
space of functions on usual space Q ∼= {ϕ(.) : R3 → R}.
To avoid the various infinities related with field theo-
ries, one can, instead, use a lattice regularization on a
large enough cube with periodic boundary conditions,
which gives the finite dimensional configuration space
Q ∼= {ϕ(.) : Z3N → R}. This regularization distorts es-
sentially nothing relevant below.
Using the same considerations as used above for the
particle ontology, we find similarly that we have to re-
strict ourselves to stationary low energy states.
But in the field ontology, a stationary single particle
state is described in a way which differs a lot from the
case of particle ontology. A stationary state is classically
a standing wave, thus, has the form ϕ(x, t) = f(t)ϕ(x)
and therefore depends only on a single coordinate of the
configuration space, a linear combination of the natural
coordinates qx defined by the value ϕ(x) of the field at
the point x, so that qϕ =
∫
ϕ(x)qx is the coordinate
associated with a particular standing wave field configu-
ration ϕ(x). The wave functional depends only on this
particular coordinate, Ψ(q) = Ψ(qϕ.
Unfortunately, in a one-dimensional space one cannot
construct any state where the wave function has zeros
which cannot be removed by a small distortion. As
3 For various approaches to handle gauge fields in stochastic field
theory see [16]. Note that such approaches are not obliged to
implement modern BRST quantization schemes, they can even
simply break gauge invariance so that they can be handled like
vector fields. Fermions can be obtained using a Z2-valued field
theory, which can be obtained as the low energy sector of a scalar
field theory with a degenerated vacuum state. Following [22], a
Z2-valued lattice theory in a three-dimensional space gives in the
large distance limit a doublet of Dirac fermions, which would
be sufficient to describe all fermions of the SM with massive
neutrinos.
5in one-dimensional quantum theory, all the non-vacuum
eigenstates will be real and have zeros, and once we have
a symmetry ϕ→ −ϕ, for the one-particle eigenstate the
zero will be one at the origin, Ψ(0) = 0. But this zero
will not be stable, the minor imaginary contribution of
the vacuum Ψ(qϕ)→ Ψ(qϕ) + iεΨvac(q) will destroy it.
A stable zero requires at least a two-dimensional sub-
space. In principle, a moving particle would give it. But
this leads to the problem with states of moving particles
considered above: What can be resonably constructed is
the state of an emitter, and correspondingly only a super-
position of the vacuum with the particle states emitted
at different times. Thus, it seems quite plausible that in
this case the vacuum contribution will be large enough
at every particular point to prevent zeros.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the possibility to meet the Wall-
strom objection against Nelsonian stochastics and sim-
ilar stochastic interpretations of quantum mechanics in
a quite radical way: To embrace it by explicitly modify-
ing quantum theory, adding a new postulate to quantum
theory that the wave function in the configuration space
representation does not have any zeros.
Because the modified theory can be empirically falsi-
fied without falsifying quantum theory itself, the mod-
ification adds empirical (predictive) power to quantum
theory, and therefore has to be preferred by Popper’s
criterion of empirical content in comparison to standard
quantum theory until it is empirically falsified.
Given that the additional predictions depend on the
choice of the configuration space, variants of stochastic
mechanics based on different choices of the configuration
space become different physical theories.
We have considered two examples of such theories for
the case of a scalar field theory, namely the variants with
particle ontology (stochastic particle theory) and with
field ontology (stochastic field theory).
We have identified some problems related with possible
empirical falsifications of such theories. The main prob-
lem is that these theories have no superposition principle
– one cannot be sure that a superposition of valid pure
states of the theory is also a valid pure state. So, if one
wants to interpret some experiment as a falsification of
such a theory, one has to be careful that one does not use,
even implicitly, a superposition principle somewhere in
the interpretation of the experiment. Moreover, prepara-
tion procedures have uncontrollable uncertainties, so that
one has to construct wave functions with zeros which are
stable against minor modifications.
For the particle ontology, it seems nonetheless plausi-
ble that the construction of states with non-trivial angu-
lar momentum allows to falsify the theory. With some
probability, what has been already reached for the con-
struction of quantum computers may be already sufficient
to falsify stochastic particle theory. Even if not, nothing
seems to endanger the possibility that states which would
falsify the particle ontology could be constructed.
The consideration of field ontology suggests a different
result. Stationary one-particle states appear insufficient
to prove the existence of a stable zero in a wave function.
It seems not implausible that more complex states, which
have zeroes even if distorted by minor modifications of
the wave function, will not be stationary states. This
would make it difficult to construct them in a sufficiently
certain way.
Thus, it is at least not implausible that the final result
would be an empirical falsification of stochastic mechan-
ics for particle ontology together with the failure to falsify
in a similar way stochastic mechanics for field ontology.
If this guess survives the consideration of fields with
spin and real experiments will be left to future research.
If it appears correct, the Wallstrom objection appears
to be not a bug but a tool to show that stochastic field
theory is even superior to quantum field theory, given its
superiority according to Popper’s criterion of empirical
content and the failure to falsify it empirically.
On the other hand, it leads to an empirical argument
against a particle ontology of field theories. Thus, the
classical “particle or wave” question of quantum theory is
no longer metaphysical, but allows an empirical answer.
Of course, this empirical answer is of limited value,
because what can be falsified is only stochastic particle
theory, not quantum particle theory, thus, proponents of
particle theory have a natural fallback theory.
On the other hand, there are anyway already strong
metaphysical arguments against a particle ontology for
field theories. In particular, the very definition of the
particles depend, in semiclassical gravity, on the particu-
lar state of the gravitational field. While this is unprob-
lematic for pseudoparticles like phonons, but it would be
strange for fundamental particles. Moreover, for a pho-
ton, there exists not even a position measurement opera-
tor (see, for example, [17]). Thus, a field ontology seems
preferable anyway. In this situation, to add an empirical
argument in favor of a field ontology could be decisive.
Last but not least, let’s note that this paper shows that
what looks metaphysical may soon, and in completely
unsuspected ways, become physical. The way how it has
happened here is not untypical: There was a problem of
a particular metaphysical interpretation. To solve this
problem, it appears natural and necessary to modify the
theory. This shows that the consideration of different
interpretations should not be rejected as metaphysical –
it is a natural step toward the development of different
physical theories, theories which have to be created to
solve particular metaphysical problems of a particular
interpretation.
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